University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Law School

2017

Traditional Problems: Gay Marriage and the Backlash against
Indian Sovereignty
Marcia A. Yablon-Zug
University of South Carolina School of Law, zug@law.sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marcia A. Yablon-Zug, Traditional Problems: Gay Marriage and the Backlash against Indian Sovereignty,
43 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 761 (2017).

This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Mitchell Hamline Law Review
Volume 43 | Issue 4

Article 3

2017

Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex
Marriage Bans Threaten Tribal Sovereignty
Marcia Zug

Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr
Part of the Family Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Sexuality and
the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Zug, Marcia (2017) "Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten Tribal Sovereignty," Mitchell Hamline Law
Review: Vol. 43 : Iss. 4 , Article 3.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mitchell Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Zug: Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten

TRADITIONAL PROBLEMS: HOW TRIBAL SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE BANS THREATEN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Marcia Zug†
I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.
VI.

INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 761
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN INDIAN COUNTRY ............................ 768
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY, TRADITION, AND UNFAIRNESS ........... 773
A. Interpreting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez................... 774
B. The Cherokee Freedmen ...................................................... 777
TRIBAL TRADITIONS AND FAIRNESS ....................................... 783
A. Crow Dog and Tribal Justice ............................................ 784
B. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Dollar General
Corp. ............................................................................... 787
1. Unsophisticated Tribal Courts ...................................... 789
2. Traditions, Customs, and Bias..................................... 792
C. The Indian Child Welfare Act ............................................ 795
THE FUTURE .......................................................................... 797
CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 800

In another time he would have been honored. Instead he was
murdered.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The above statement is from the PBS documentary Two Spirits,
a film examining the life and tragic death of Fred Martinez, a sixteenyear-old Navajo Indian, born physically male, who identified as
female.2 The documentary explores the circumstances that led to

† Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina, School of Law.
1. TWO
SPIRITS
(PBS
2011),
http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/two-spirits/; see also ICMN Staff, PBS
Documentary Explores Navajo Belief in Four Genders, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK (Nov. 5, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/11
/05/pbs-documentary-explores-navajo-belief-four-genders-152094.
2. TWO SPIRITS, supra note 1.
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Martinez’s death while also more broadly discussing the treatment
of gay, lesbian, and transgendered Navajo people.3 As the film notes,
gender non-conformity was once an accepted part of Navajo
culture.4 Traditionally, the Navajo recognized four genders: male,
female, male-born persons living as female, and female-born persons
living as male, and they held these dual-gender or “two spirit” people
in high regard.5 The Navajo view of two-spirit people was not
unique.6 Historically, many American Indian tribes honored their
transgendered members,7 but by the nineteenth century, this
tolerance began to disappear.8 European colonizers and their
descendants viewed homosexuality as an intolerable sin, and they

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Jeffrey S. Jacobi, Two Spirits, Two Eras, Same Sex: For a Traditionalist Perspective
on Native American Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Policy, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823, 837
(2006) (discussing the behaviors and relationships of “men,” “women,” “malebodied” individuals, and “female-bodied” individuals); see also BRIAN JOSEPH GILLEY,
BECOMING TWO-SPIRIT: GAY IDENTITY AND SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 10–
11 (2006) (stating that “two-spirits” were often seen as having special powers, and
that many tribes believed “[t]he gender different were possessed of a special
relationship with the Creator because they were seen as being able to bridge the
personal and spiritual gap between men and women”); WILL ROSCOE, CHANGING
ONES: THIRD AND FOURTH GENDERS IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 3 (1998) (“accepted
and sometimes honored”); Jacobi, supra (“Alternative gender roles have been
documented in approximately 155 tribes . . . .”); id. at 823 (“[H]istorically, many
tribes accepted and even honored same sex-unions.”). But see TWO-SPIRIT PEOPLE:
NATIVE AMERICAN GENDER IDENTITY, SEXUALITY, AND SPIRITUALITY 5 (Sue-Ellen Jacobs
et al. eds., 1997) (criticizing scholars and other non-Natives for an “idealizing view”
of the past that “has led to a relatively recent romanticization of purported positively
sanctioned pan-Indian gender or sexual categories that do not fit the reality of
experiences faced by many contemporary gay, lesbian, third-gender, transgender,
and otherwise two-spirit Native Americans”).
6. Jacobi, supra note 5, at 823 (“[M]any [commentators] agree that
indigenous tribes often tolerated and even celebrated [‘Native American individuals
whose behavior did not comport with European gender norms’].” (citations
omitted)).
7. Id.
8. See Trista Wilson, Comment, Changed Embraces, Changes Embraced?
Renouncing the Heterosexist Majority in Favor of a Return to Traditional Two-Spirit Culture,
36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 161, 173 (2012) (citations omitted) (“Native Americans likely
responded to the ‘Euro-American condemnation of the gender different’ by hiding
that part of their culture . . . . As this [European acculturalization and assimilation]
trend continued, two-spirit culture became increasingly suppressed until, in many
cases, it was altogether hidden or eliminated.”).
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exerted increasing pressure9 on tribal communities to adopt similar
views regarding family and sexuality.10 Eventually, this pressure led
to a dramatic decline in tribal acceptance of homosexual and
transgendered Indian people.11
Today, many tribes are rejecting these colonially imposed
beliefs regarding gender and homosexuality.12 For instance, a
substantial number of tribes were at the forefront of the fight for
marriage equality.13 These path-clearing tribes used their unique
status as separate sovereigns to recognize same-sex marriages before,
and sometimes in defiance of, the surrounding states.14 In a few
instances, the marriage codes of these tribes even served as a model
9. Christian missionaries and Indian agents targeted gender non-conforming
Indians through the provisions of the Religious Crimes Code. See id. (“By the early
1880s, Christian missionaries and Indian agents were using [these laws] ‘to
aggressively attack Native sexual and marriage practices,’ and to pressure tribal
communities to adopt the Euro-American ideals on family and sexuality.”).
10. In fact, tribes’ acceptance of homosexuality was one of the reasons often
cited as evidence of American Indians’ inferiority and was used as part of the
justification for the conquest of North America. See GILLEY, supra note 5, at 13–14.
11. Id. at 13 (stating that Anglo-American aversion towards homosexuality was
clearly “communicated to the Indians,” causing gender non-conforming Indians to
lead “repressed or disguised lives”).
12. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 175 (“Two-spirit organizations across the
country are engaged in an effort to promote two-spirit culture, both inside and
outside Indian Country. And although some tribes have legislated against same-sex
marriage, others have affirmatively legislated in its favor.”); see also Ann E. Tweedy,
Tribal Laws & Same-Sex Marriage: Theory, Process, and Content, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 104, 110 (2015) (“Twelve tribes are known to allow same-sex marriage, either
due to amendments to tribal laws, interpretation of a pre-existing marriage law, or,
in one case, the explicit incorporation of state marriage law.”).
13. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 12, at 110–31 (discussing laws, ranging from
explicit recognition of same-sex marriage to potential recognition of same-sex
relationships performed in other places, created by various Native American tribes);
see also Julie Bushyhead, The Coquille Indian Tribe, Same-Sex Marriage, and Spousal
Benefits: A Practical Guide, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 509, 530–31 (2009) (noting
that, in 2008, the Coquille Indian Tribe in Oregon passed a law allowing same-sex
marriage).
14. See, e.g., Tweedy, supra note 12, at 112 (“At the time Coquille [in Oregon]
passed its law in February 2008, Massachusetts was the only state that allowed samesex marriage.”). Similarly, the Suquamish Tribe of Washington legalized same-sex
marriage well before the state of Washington, where it is located. See Ashley Fantz,
Washington Voters Pass Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.cnn
.com/2012/11/09/us/washington-passes-same-sex-marriage/index.html; William
Yardley, A Washington State Indian Tribe Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/12tribe.html.
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for subsequent state legalization.15 Similarly, many tribes are also
rediscovering their “two-spirit” traditions.16 These tribes once again
recognize the value of their transgender members, and their
approach to gender and sexuality is increasingly proffered as a
model of tolerance that LGBT advocates believe should be adopted
by both Indian and non-Indian communities.17 Such changes are
encouraging. Unfortunately, they are not universal. Two years after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,18 in which the
Court found same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional, many tribes
display little interest in accepting same-sex marriage or the two-spirit
tradition.19
Currently, a significant number of tribes still ban same-sex
marriage.20 Prior to the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision, this ban
15. See, e.g., Walter L. Williams, The ‘Two-Spirit’ People of Indigenous North
Americans,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
11,
2010),
https://www.theguardian.com
/music/2010/oct/11/two-spirit-people-north-america; see also Wilhelm Murg,
Momentum Mounts to Again Embrace Two-Spirits, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK
(June 6, 2011), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/momentum
-mounts-to-again-embrace-two-spirits/ (discussing the re-incorporation of a gender
variant identity into many tribal cultures).
16. Wilson, supra note 8, at 176 (“During the 1990s, the LGBT Native American
community began emphasizing their unique place within the gay community by
focusing on the rich history of two-spirit culture and the value tribes traditionally
placed on those individuals.”).
17. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 5, at 848 (encouraging tribes to use their
“sovereignty to make independent decisions on this matter [of same-sex marriage]”
and warning that they “should be wary of disregarding their traditions, which are
integral to tribal identity”); Wilson, supra note 8, at 163 (urging tribes to break with
“prejudicial state precedent” and endorsing “tribal government recognition of
same-sex marriage, with the goals of returning to traditional tribal values,
promoting inclusivity within the tribal community”).
18. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
19. See Tweedy, supra note 12, at 131–32 (discussing twelve tribes that, as of
2012, had Defense of Marriage Acts); see also Jacobi, supra note 5, at 846 (“[M]any
Native American tribes have disregarded the traditional respect given two-spirits,
and adopted European American and Christian views on homosexuality and gender
difference.”).
20. See infra note 23 (discussing tribal bans). In addition, it should be noted
that the discrimination against LGBT tribal members is not limited to marriage. See,
e.g., Eben Blake, Native American LGBT Discrimination: Obama Administration Pushing
Housing Protections for Gays on Tribal Land, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 28, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.com/native-american-lgbt-discrimination-obama
-administration-pushing-housing-protections-1942835
(describing
potential
discrimination in tribal housing projects); see also ICMN Staff, Study: Transgender
Native Americans Experience Discrimination at Worst Rates, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA
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elicited little national notice.21 However, once the Court declared
state marriage bans unconstitutional, tribal bans became the glaring
exception to nationwide marriage equality.22 Tribes with same-sex
marriage bans are now under increasing pressure to adopt the
Supreme Court’s view of marriage equality and repeal their marriage
bans.23 In most cases, these requests have been ignored.24
Tribal marriage bans prevent thousands of native men and
women from marrying their chosen partners. Moreover, the impact
NETWORK (Oct. 12, 2012), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/study
-transgender-native-americans-experience-discrimination-at-worst-rates/
(noting
that the bias experienced by transgender people “extends into virtually all aspects
of their lives”).
21. See Elizabeth Dias, A Gay Marriage Loophole for Native Americans, TIME (Nov.
1, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/11/01/a-gay-marriage-loophole-for-native
-americans/ (discussing a tribe that granted a same-sex couple a marriage license,
but also noting that “[t]he wedding has brought attention to a subset of the
marriage equality movement that often flies under the radar”).
22. See Ann E. Tweedy, Tribes, Same-Sex Marriage, and Obergefell v. Hodges, FED.
LAW., Oct.–Nov. 2015, at 6, 6 (“Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed
that the Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry . . . Indian
tribes are suddenly the only governmental entities in the United States that have the
option not to allow same-sex couples to marry within their jurisdictions.”); Steven J.
Alagna, Note, Why Obergefell Should Not Impact American Indian Tribal Marriage Laws,
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1577 (2016) (considering how Native American tribes will be
impacted by the Supreme Court’s ruling).
23. See, e.g., Felicia Fonseca, U.S. Same-Sex Marriage Challenged by Native American
Sovereignty, THE STAR (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015
/11/27/us-same-sex-marriage-challenged-by-native-american-sovereignty.html;
Marcia Zug, Why Same-Sex Marriage Bans Risk Native American Sovereignty, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10
/tribal-same-sex-marriage-bans/503345/ (“Couples that live on American Indian
reservations are beyond the reach of constitutional protections because of the
unique legal status of Native American tribes . . . . Tribal governments are therefore
allowed to continue to ban same-sex marriage despite the Court’s ruling.”); Hayley
Fowler, Gay Marriage Discouraged Within American Indian Tribes, DAILYTARHEEL.COM
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/08/native-american
-gay-marriage (discussing the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ marriage ban);
Matthew Tharrett, Native American Tribes Passing Same-Sex Marriage Bans Ahead of
Supreme
Court
Mandate,
NEWNOWNEXT
(Apr.
8,
2015),
http://www.newnownext.com/native-american-tribes-passing-same-sex-marriage
-bans-ahead-of-supreme-court-mandate/04/2015/.
24. But see Hayley Miller, Cherokee Nation Will Now Recognize Same-Sex Marriage,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
9,
2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cherokee-nation-will-now-recognize-same
-sex-marriage_us_584b061fe4b04c8e2bafca0e (discussing the reversal of the
Cherokee nation’s same-sex marriage ban).
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of these bans may extend far beyond individual couples. Historically,
when tribal and Anglo-American values conflict, the result is an
increased perception by non-Indians that tribes are backwards,
inferior, and unjust, and this effect is particularly pronounced in
instances where tribal law or custom reflect a position specifically
and forcefully rejected by American law.25 Consequently, there is a
real danger that the continuation of tribal same-sex marriage bans
post-Obergefell will negatively affect how tribes and tribal justice are
perceived. This perception could then become the catalyst for
reversing many of the recent gains in tribal court jurisdiction.26
This article examines the potential impact of tribal same-sex
marriage bans in light of America’s long history of distrusting and
dismantling Indian traditions that conflict with contemporary
American beliefs regarding fairness and morality. As this article
demonstrates, the appeal to tradition has not fared well in same-sex
marriage debates, and this is likely to hold true in the Indian law
context as well. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court specifically rejected
arguments based on tradition and held that regardless of tradition,
laws limiting marriage to one man and one woman no longer reflect
contemporary understandings of equality and cannot continue.27
Tribes argue they are not bound by Obergefell and have the right to
continue to promote their traditional concept of marriage.28 They
25. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard
Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS.
L. REV. 219, 274 (1986) (“Tribes must exercise their ‘rights’ to self-determination so
as not to conflict with the interests of the dominant sovereign. In effect, this form
of discourse enforces a highly efficient process of legal auto-genocide, the ultimate
hegemonic effect of which is to instruct the savage to self-extinguish all troublesome
expressions of difference that diverge from the white man’s own hierarchic,
universalized worldview.”).
26. See infra Part IV.
27. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“The right to marry is
fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient
sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era . . . .
[W]hen [opposition to same-sex marriage] becomes enacted law and public policy,
the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an
exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then
denied.”).
28. For example, Otto Tso, a Navajo legislator and medicine man, stated, “We
have to look at our culture, our society, where we come from, [and] talk to our
elders.” Julie Turkewitz, Among the Navajos, a Renewed Debate About Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/us/among-the
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are correct. However, due to their potential to influence national
perceptions regarding tribal justice, tribes should be wary of making
such arguments. In recent years, tribes have slowly been permitted
to increase their authority over crimes perpetrated by non-Indians
on tribal lands. Unfortunately, negative perceptions of tribal fairness
could quickly eliminate these important gains.
American courts and legislatures have frequently used the
difference, or at least the supposed difference, between Indian and
non-Indian values to justify limiting tribal sovereignty.29
Consequently, although tribes have the right to ban same-sex
marriages, there is a real danger that these bans will reinforce the
long-standing and deeply-entrenched belief that tribal laws and
customs are unjust and that tribal jurisdiction should be limited.
Thus, the dangerous irony of tribal marriage bans is that these laws
may ultimately wind up threatening the very sovereignty tribes rely
upon to defend them.
Part II of this article discusses the semi-sovereign status of tribes
and explains how this status enables tribes to ban same-sex marriage
post-Obergefell.30 Part III examines the connection between Indian
sovereignty and conflicts between Indian and non-Indian customs.31

-navajos-a-renewed-debate-about-gay-marriage.html. Other Navajo members
echoed these sentiments. Supporters of the Navajo marriage ban, such as Katherine
Benally, argued that the ban “would strengthen our traditional values.” 2005 Diné
Coalition for Cultural Preservation, A History of the Dine Marriage Act and the Efforts to
Stop It from Becoming Law, NATIVE OUT (Apr. 22, 2005), http://nativeout.com
/twospirit-rc/tribal-marriage-equality/dine-marriage-act-of-2005/. Navajo member
Harriet Becenti noted, “Men and women have been created in a sacred manner. We
need to honor this.” Id. Orlanda Smith-Hodge stated, “Many tell us our teachings
come from our home. Our elders have taught us much, and unfortunately it appears
we are leaving our traditional values. [The ban] is moving in the spirit of preserving
cultural teachings.” Id.
Similar arguments were also made by Todd Hembree, the lawyer for the
Cherokee Nation who drafted the amendment banning same-sex marriage.
Hembree defended the ban, stating, “‘Cherokees have a strong traditional sense of
marriage,’ and ‘[t]hroughout [Cherokee] history, there’s never been a tribal
recognition of same-sex marriage.’” Jacobi, supra note 5, at 828–29. The Cherokee
Nation has now reversed its position on same-sex marriage. Interestingly, this
reversal is also justified by reference to Cherokee culture and tradition.
29. See generally Matthew Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against
Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2007).
30. Infra Part II.
31. Infra Part III.
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Using the well-known decisions of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez32 and
the Cherokee Freedmen cases,33 this Part demonstrates that
assertions of tribal sovereignty in contested-values cases can create
the perception that Indian sovereignty perpetuates unjust and
problematic values.34 Part IV examines the recent Dollar General35
decision and argues that cases like Dollar General, which were brought
to limit tribal sovereignty, and cases like Santa Clara and the
Cherokee Freedmen cases, which attempt to affirm that sovereignty,
are actually two sides of the same coin.36 The latter are typically
described as “wins” for tribal sovereignty, but they have actually been
instrumental in undermining it.37 As Dollar General demonstrates,
fear of tribal custom and tradition remain an effective means of
attacking tribal jurisdiction.38 Finally, Part V explores the recent
gains in tribal criminal jurisdiction.39 This article concludes by
suggesting that the assertion of tribal sovereignty in the same-sex
marriage context risks increasing the perception that tribes are
unjust and potentially reversing the recent increases in tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.40
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court declared same-sex
marriage bans unconstitutional pursuant to both the Due Process
32. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
33. Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1460–61 (10th Cir. 1989);
Cherokee Nation Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, 2011 WL 8843901 (Cherokee
Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011); Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, JAT-04-09
(Cherokee App. Trib. Mar. 7, 2006), rev’g Riggs v. Ummerteskee, JAT-97-03-K
(Cherokee App. Trib. Aug. 15, 2001).
34. Infra Part III.
35. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
36. Infra Part IV.
37. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to S. Joe Crittenden, Acting Principal Chief, The
Cherokee
Nation
(Sept.
9,
2011),
http://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/news/tribal/6005-letter-from-echo-hawk
-regarding-cherokee-freedmen-upcoming-election (expressing that the federal
government may not honor recent tribal decisions because said actions do not line
up with previous treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the U.S. government).
38. Cf. Aaron F. Arnold et al., State and Tribal Courts: Strategies for Bridging the
Divide, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 801, 816–18 (2012) (discussing misperceptions about tribal
law arising from the significant scrutiny to which tribal law has been subjected).
39. Infra Part V.
40. Infra Part V.
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and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.41 As a result of this decision, state marriage bans
immediately became unenforceable.42 Nevertheless, despite the
Obergefell decision, tribal marriage bans remain in effect.43
Tribes approach same-sex marriage in a variety of different ways.
A number of tribes were at the forefront of the same-sex marriage
movement,44 but others, including the Navajo, the largest federally
recognized tribe, continue to ban such unions.45 The Navajo alone
have a population of more than 300,000 members,46 and there are
at least another 350,000 members of smaller tribes who are also

41. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry
is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
42. Id. at 2607–08 (“The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that that the Court
must also hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to
refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the
ground of its same-sex character.”)
43. See Zug, supra note 23 (discussing tribes that continue to allow same-sex
marriage bans, even after Obergefell).
44. For example, the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel, located near San Diego,
California, enacted its marriage resolution before same-sex marriage became legal
in California. Tweedy, supra note 12, at 125 (noting that the Tribe’s “resolution was
passed before the Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, in which the
Supreme Court indirectly legalized same-sex marriage in California”); Jean
Walcher, California Native American Tribe Announces Support of Same Sex Marriage:
Santa Ysabel Tribe First in California to Make Proclamation, BUS. WIRE (June 24, 2013),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130624005344/en/California
-Native-American-Tribe-Announces-Support-Sex. Similarly, Oregon’s Collville Tribe
and Oklahoma’s Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes each recognized same-sex marriages
before their respective states did so. Andrew Potts, 8th US Native American Tribe Allows
Same-Sex
Couples
to
Wed,
GAY
STAR
NEWS
(Nov.
16,
2013),
www.gaystarnews.com/article/8th-us-native-american-tribe-allows-same-sex-couples
-wed161113/#gs.Pu=_B7g. Other tribes supportive of same-sex marriage before
Obergefell include the Coquille, Suquamish, Pokagon, Tlingit and Haida, Puyallup,
Mashantucket Pequot, Colville, Little Traverse, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Leech Lake
Band of Ojibwe, Eastern Shoshone, Northern Arapaho, Iipay Nation of Santa
Ysabel, and Keweenaw Bay Indian Community. Tweedy, supra note 12, at 110–11.
45. See Alagna, supra note 22, at 1586 (“At least eleven tribal sovereigns have
legislative bans on same-sex marriage, including . . . the Navajo Nation.” (citations
omitted)).
46. Bill Donovan, Census: Navajo Enrollment Tops 300,000, NAVAJO TIMES (July 7,
2011), http://navajotimes.com/news/2011/0711/070711census.php.
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affected by tribal marriage bans.47 Consequently, even after Obergefell,
there are hundreds of thousands of Americans still subject to samesex marriage bans.
Tribal bans remain in effect post-Obergefell for two reasons. The
first is that the provisions in the Bill of Rights bind states and the
federal government, but they do not bind tribes.48 As the Supreme
Court explained in Talton v. Mayes,49 Indian tribes
were, and always have been, regarded as having a semiindependent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as states, not as nations, not as possessed of
the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people,
with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the
Union, or of the state within whose limits they resided.50
The second reason Obergefell is not binding on tribes is because
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), a federal statute that made many
constitutional provisions applicable to tribes, allows tribes to
interpret ICRA’s provisions according to their own customs and
traditions.51 Therefore, although the equal protection and due
process rights encapsulated in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution are applicable to tribes through
ICRA, tribal courts are not required to interpret ICRA rights in the
same way the federal courts have interpreted the corresponding
constitutional rights.52
47. James King, Two Largest Native American Tribes in U.S. Ban Gay Marriage,
VOCATIV (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.vocativ.com/culture/lgbt/two-largest-native
-american-tribes-in-u-s-ban-gay-marriage/. Tribes with such bans include: “Navajo
Nation, Blue Lake Rancheria, Chickasaw Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Coos,
Lower Umqua, and Siuslaw Indians, Grand Traverse Band of Chippewa Indians, Nez
Perce Tribe, the Oneida Indian Nation, the Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in
Iowa, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.” Tweedy, supra note 12, at 131–32.
48. See id. at 147 (“[T]ribes, being distinct from both states and the federal
government, are not generally subject to the constitutional obligations in the Bill of
Rights.”).
49. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
50. Id. at 384.
51. See Tweedy, supra note 22, at *7 (“[A]lthough tribes are required to abide
by a federal statute that contains equal protection and due process rights, namely
the ICRA, tribes are empowered to interpret those rights according to their own
cultures and traditions and need not follow the federal courts’ interpretations of
what those rights mean.”).
52. As Professor Ann Tweedy has explained, “ICRA reflects a compromise
between protecting tribes’ rights to self-determination and protecting the rights of
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The goal of ICRA is to ensure that American Indians receive
basic constitutional rights and are protected “from arbitrary and
unjust actions of tribal governments.”53 However, it is not a
constitutional clone. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme
Court held that the desire to provide American Indians with
constitutional protections must be balanced against the wellestablished federal “policy of furthering Indian self-government.”54
The Court confirmed that ICRA’s provisions protect tribal members,
but it also held that it is up to the tribal governments to determine
how these provisions will be interpreted and enforced.55
Santa Clara concerned the Pueblo’s membership rules, which
permitted male tribal members to pass their tribal membership onto
their children regardless of the mother’s eligibility but denied a
reciprocal right to the Pueblo’s female members.56 These sex-based
membership laws appeared to be a clear case of gender
discrimination, and, thus, tribal member Julia Martinez challenged
the rules under the equal protection provision of ICRA.57 In
considering the case, the Court weighed Martinez’s individual right
to be free of discrimination against the Pueblo’s interest in

individual tribal citizens and others who are subject to tribal jurisdiction. If tribes
were required to interpret ICRA rights in the same manner federal courts interpret
constitutional rights, this would have an assimilating effect on tribes.” Id.
53. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1978) (citing S. REP.
NO. 841, at 5–6 (1967)) (“We note at the outset that a central purpose of the ICRA
and in particular of Title I was to . . . ‘protect individual Indians from arbitrary and
unjust actions of tribal governments.’”).
54. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974)).
55. Although this article discusses ways in which ICRA allows tribes to offer
what many view as lesser protections, it should be noted that there are also examples
where tribes have interpreted ICRA provisions to offer greater protections than the
corresponding constitutional provision. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty
and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 810 n.70 (1997) (“Some tribes have gone
further than ICRA’s mandates and ensure the right to counsel for indigent
defendants in criminal cases.”). One such example is the Navajo tribe. 1 NAVAJO
CODE § 7 (1995) (stating that “nor shall any person be denied the right to have the
assistance of counsel, at their own expense, and to have defense counsel appointed
in accordance with the rules of the courts of the Navajo Nation upon satisfactory
proof to the court of their inability to provide for their own counsel for the defense
of any punishable offense under the laws of the Navajo Nation”).
56. See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 49.
57. Id. at 51.
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controlling its membership.58 Describing the importance of this
control, the district court stated it was
no more or less than a mechanism of social, and to an
extent psychological and cultural, self-definition. The
importance of this to Santa Clara or to any other Indian
tribe cannot be overstressed. In deciding who is and who is
not a member, the Pueblo decides what it is that makes its
members unique, what distinguishes a Santa Clara Indian
from everyone else in the United States.59
The Supreme Court cited Worchester v. Georgia60 and similar
cases61 in order to demonstrate that tribes have the right to manage
their internal decisions and that this right includes membership
choices.62 The Court agreed that ICRA secured broad constitutional
protections for tribal members, but it also clarified that
constitutional protections under ICRA are not necessarily the same
as the constitutional protections that apply to non-tribal members.63
According to the Court, the equal protection challenges pursuant to
ICRA should be evaluated against the background of tribal
sovereignty, and it specifically noted that ICRA does not require the
imposition of an Anglo-American standard of equal protection if to
do so would violate traditional values or harm the “cultural identity”
of Indian tribes.64 The Santa Clara decision, therefore, confirmed

58. Id. at 49–50. “This case requires us to decide whether a federal court may
pass on the validity of an Indian tribe’s ordinance denying membership to the
children of certain female tribal members.” Id. at 51–52.
59. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 15 (D. N.M. 1975), rev’d,
540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 436 U.S. 49.
60. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559
(1832)).
61. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55–56. These cases recognize and affirm tribal
sovereignty. They include: United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); United States v.
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Roff v. Burney, 168
U.S. 218 (1897); and United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
62. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 55–56.
63. Id. at 60–62 (“Section 1302 [of the ICRA], rather than providing in
wholesale fashion for the extension of constitutional requirements to tribal
governments . . . selectively incorporated and in some instances modified the
safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic
needs of tribal governments.”).
64. Id. at 72. Quoting the district court in its description of the case, the Santa
Clara Court stated,
[T]he equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act should
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that tribal courts, rather than federal courts, should be the primary
arbiters of ICRA disputes and that Indian tribunals are free to
consider tribal customs and traditions in their decisions.65
After Santa Clara, it was clear that tribes are not bound by the
federal definition of gender equality and, instead, are free to use
tradition and custom to determine what is fair treatment toward
their male and female members.66 Santa Clara additionally means
that tribes are also not bound by the Obergefell Court’s interpretation
of gender and sex equality. Instead, tribes can evaluate the right to
same-sex marriage based on their own tribal customs and traditions,
and they are free to conclude that these traditions and values
support the continuation of tribal same-sex marriage bans.
III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY, TRADITION, AND UNFAIRNESS
Santa Clara was considered a win for the tribe and tribal
sovereignty.67 However, it was not considered a win for Indian
not be construed in a manner which would require or authorize this
Court to determine which traditional values will promote cultural
survival and should therefore should be preserved . . . . Such a
determination should be made by the people of Santa Clara; not only
because they can best decide what values are important, but also because
they must live with the decision every day. . . .
. . . To abrogate tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of
membership, for whatever “good” reasons, is to destroy cultural identity
under the guise of saving it.
Id. at 54 (citing Santa Clara, 402 F. Supp. at 18–19).
65. See id. at 65 (“Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.”); see also id. at 71 (“By not
exposing tribal officials to the full array of federal remedies available to redress
actions of federal and state officials, Congress may also have considered that
resolution of statutory issues under § 1302, and particularly those issues likely to
arise in a civil context, will frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and
custom which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than federal
courts.”). According to the Santa Clara Court, Congress limited the enforcement of
ICRA claims to tribal court in order to “avoid[] unnecessary intrusions on tribal
governments.” Id. at 67. Consequently, there is no appeal from these tribal court
decisions to federal court. The only explicit federal remedy under ICRA is habeas
corpus.
66. See id. at 71.
67. See Francine R. Skenandore, Comment, Revisiting Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez: Feminist Perspectives on Tribal Sovereignty, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 347, 347
(2002) (“For practitioners, scholars, and students of federal Indian law, Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez is the most frequently cited case for upholding tribal
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women.68 In fact, even in the Court’s decision, it is clear that the
justices viewed this case as a conflict between women’s rights and
tribal rights.69 As the Court noted, recognizing Martinez’s claim for
injunctive relief would protect her individual rights, but it “would be
at odds with the congressional goal of protecting tribal selfgovernment.”70 Consequently, the implication of the Santa Clara
decision was not that the Pueblo’s ordinance was fair, but that unfair
laws are the price one pays for protecting tribal sovereignty and
preserving Indian culture and heritage.71
A.

Interpreting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez

A few scholars have suggested that the Pueblo’s claim of a
patrilineal membership tradition was overstated and the case did not
truly present a conflict between cultural traditions.72 Nevertheless,
most commentators accepted the tribe’s description of its patrilineal
traditions and, like the Court, viewed the case as a disagreement

sovereignty.”).
68. See id. The author explains that “[m]ainstream feminists claim that the
Court overlooked the equal protection claim and upheld tribal sovereignty at the
expense of female equality,” while “Indian feminists view tribal sovereignty from the
perspective that it is crucial to the cultural survival of Indian women.” Id.
69. See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62 (“Two distinct and competing purposes are
manifest in the provisions of the ICRA: In addition to its objective of strengthening
the position of individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe, Congress also intended
to promote the well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian selfgovernment.’” (citation omitted)).
70. Id. at 64.
71. See id. at 72 (“[W]e are constrained to find that § 1302 does not impliedly
authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its
officers.”).
72. For example, Judith Resnik has questioned whether this membership rule
could really have come from the enduring culture of the Santa Clara people when
it is
linked to the Pueblo’s decision to organize under the guidance of the
Department of the Interior, is linked to the Pueblo as a recipient of
federal funds, and is linked to the Pueblo as situated in a United States
culture that has made patrilineal and patriarchal rules so familiar that,
to some, they seem uncontroversial.
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 725 (1989); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case
Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 68–69 (1987) (suggesting that the male supremacist ideology of tribes like
the Santa Clara Pueblo may have been adopted from white culture).
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between two different cultures with very different values.73 Professor
Gloria Valencia-Webber’s description of the case is illustrative. She
described Santa Clara as a “conflict between American Indians and
the mainstream non-Indian world about what values should guide
when law is made for a society.”74 According to Valencia-Webber, the
case revealed the “chasm between two cultural frameworks.”75
Consequently, the conflict in Santa Clara is not over whether Indian
and non-Indian values were in conflict but, instead, whether the
preservation of the tribe’s sovereign right to continue its patrilineal
tradition was worth sacrificing the American value of gender
equality.
Rina Swentzell, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo and an
expert on Santa Clara culture, believed tribal sovereignty was worth
this sacrifice.76 In a moving essay on the Santa Clara case, Swentzell
explained that despite the fact she believed the decision was bad for
her individually, she ultimately supported it because she considered
it good for the tribe.77 She stated,
I thought long and hard about the Martinez case. I wanted
my children to be members of Santa Clara, although I had
married a non-Indian who I met in college. If the case
favored the Martinez family, who I assumed had been
encouraged by non-Native people to initiate the lawsuit, I

73. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Inequality: Old and New Strains and
American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 335 (2004) (“Indian law cases such as
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez clearly expose the tension between constitutional
individual rights conceived in an abstract sense and the tribe’s right as a cultural
and political community with distinct consensual values.”); see also supra note 68 and
accompanying text (showing the difference in opinion between “mainstream” and
“Indian” feminists).
74. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Three Stories in One: The Story of Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 451 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).
75. Id.; see also Skenandore, supra note 67, at 368 (“Santa Clara is a very difficult
case to reconcile from both a sovereignty perspective and an equal rights
perspective. Ultimately, the two positions cannot be reconciled.”); Rebecca Tsosie,
Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 508–09 (1994) (describing
the debate between those who privilege individual rights over tribal sovereignty and
vice versa).
76. See Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 97, 97 (2004) (“I wanted the courts to rule in favor of the tribe—to rule for
tribal sovereignty . . . . I also knew that it did not make sense; that it was not just or
fair.”).
77. Id. at 98–99.
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felt that Santa Clara would loose [sic] any remnants of itself
as a vital, self-determining community. I was relieved to
hear the decision. Santa Clara was to retain the on-going
conversation about who is a recognized member of the
community. But, more importantly, the Western world was
acknowledging the way of life which traditionally honored
nurturing and feminine qualities.78
Swentzell supported the decision because she believed it was
good for the Tribe, but many other commentators were unwilling to
accept the idea that the preservation of tribal sovereignty and tribal
traditions could justify discrimination against American Indian
women.79 For instance, in her excoriating critique of the Santa Clara
decision, Professor Catharine MacKinnon wrote, “[C]ultural survival
is as contingent on equality between women and men as it is upon
equality between people.”80 She therefore questions whether a
culture based on gender inequality is one capable of long-term
survival.81
As MacKinnon’s quote demonstrates, the Santa Clara decision
affirmed the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, but it did so by
reinforcing the perception that tribal sovereignty permits the
perpetuation of backwards and inferior values. Moreover, although
Santa Clara was not the first case to portray a conflict between Indian
sovereignty and American values, it was the first to do so after the
passage of ICRA, which many supporters had hoped would eliminate
these types of cultural conflicts.82 It did not. As the Santa Clara
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Carla Christofferson, Tribal Courts’ Failure to Protect Native American
Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 185 (1991)
(“The Santa Clara decision showed great respect for the sovereignty of Native
American tribes. Yet in awarding such unrestricted sovereignty, the Court has left
Native American women powerless within their communities. . . . In light of the
current plight of Native American women, an expansion of the ICRA is warranted.
Congress has a duty to provide an enforcement mechanism for the rights
enumerated in the ICRA.”). See generally Ann E. Tweedy, Sex Discrimination Under
Tribal Law, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 392 (2010) (discussing ways different Native
American tribes respond to gender discrimination cases).
80. MACKINNON, supra note 72, at 68.
81. Id. at 65.
82. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1705 (2012);
David M. Schraver & David H. Tennant, Indian Tribal Sovereignty—Current Issues, 75
ALB. L. REV. 133, 144 (2011–2012) (noting that “ICRA was prompted by complaints
about civil rights violations by Indian tribes”); Hayley Weedn, Stay Out of the Cookie
Jar: Revisiting Martinez to Explain Why the U.S. Should Keep Its Hands Out of Tribal
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decision demonstrated, ICRA could not force tribes to discard
controversial customs and traditions. This decision was a blow to the
Act’s supporters, but a bigger blow was still to come.83 Santa Clara
paved the way for the Cherokee Freedmen cases, a set of cases that
seemed to confirm Santa Clara’s critics’ worst fears regarding Indian
sovereignty and injustice.84
B.

The Cherokee Freedmen

The Cherokee Freedmen are the descendants of former
Cherokee slaves.85 In 1866, a treaty between the Cherokee Nation
and the United States freed these men and women and granted
them the rights and privileges of Cherokee citizenship.86 Despite this
treaty promise, the Freedmen were routinely and systematically
excluded from participation in tribal affairs, and, over time, this
exclusion became increasingly pronounced.87 By the late 1970s, the
Freedmen had been entirely disenfranchised and denied their
citizenship rights.88
Constitutionalism and Internal Self-Governance, 20 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL.
18, 38 (2012) (“[ICRA] was initially prompted due to ‘[c]omplaints received by the
[Senate S]ubcommittee [on Constitutional Rights] alleging that Indians were being
deprived of their rights by Federal, State, and tribal governments.’ Congress was
thus persuaded that the gap in application of some of the most fundamental of U.S.
constitutional values between tribal members and tribal governments left Natives
particularly vulnerable to abuses.”).
83. See Skenandore, supra note 67, at 368 (noting that in response to the
decision, “equal rights supporters propose to amend the ICRA as a means of
protecting the equal rights of Julia Martinez and other women within their tribes”);
see also Christofferson, supra note 79, at 170 (arguing “that an expansion of the ICRA
is necessary to protect Native American women from discriminatory actions by their
tribes”).
84. See Circe Sturm, Race, Sovereignty, and Civil Rights: Understanding the Cherokee
ANTHROPOLOGY
575
(2014),
Freedmen
Controversy,
29
CULTURAL
https://culanth.org/articles/751-race-sovereignty-and-civil-rights-understanding
(discussing the Cherokee Freedmen).
85. S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of
Freedmen’s Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 387 (2007); see also Lolita Buckner
Inniss, Cherokee Freedmen and the Color of Belonging, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 100, 114–17
(2015), http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/844.
86. Ray, supra note 85, at 390.
87. See Sturm, supra note 84, at 576 (“Whether or not they have Cherokee
ancestry, Cherokee Freedmen have encountered intense opposition whenever they
have sought the full rights and benefits given other tribal citizens.”).
88. The story of the disenfranchisement of the Freemen can be summarized as
follows:
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The disenfranchisement of the Freedmen occurred when the
Cherokee tribal council changed the Tribe’s membership criteria.89
Under the new membership rules, all tribal members were required
to provide a Certificate of Indian Blood Card (CDIB) based on the
degree of blood listed on the Dawes Rolls (the 1906 list of tribal
members created by the federal government) for their ancestor.90
The catch, however, was that the Dawes Rolls did not list a degree of
blood for Freedmen tribal members.91 Consequently, this new rule
[T]he Cherokee Nation reorganized its government between 1970 and
1976 . . . . During that period, the Freedmen were quietly
disenfranchised and denied their right to citizenship. . . . These changes
occurred without the knowledge or input of the Cherokee Freedmen.
When the Reverend Roger Nero and his companions went to vote in the
Cherokee elections in 1983, they found that the definition of a Cherokee
citizen had been changed to exclude them, which came as a surprise
since Nero had voted in the last tribal election in 1979.
CIRCE DAWN STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE
NATION OF OKLAHOMA 179–80 (2002).
89. See Ray, supra note 85, at 411–12 (“The introduction of this requirement—
possession of a federally-issued [Certificate of Indian Blood Card]—into the formal
criteria for Cherokee Nation citizenship in 1977–78 marked the first time since the
Treaty of 1866 that the Nation had officially predicated citizenship on biology. . . .
The Dawes Rolls were effectively attenuated to ‘Indian blood’- based categories only,
and in subsequent elections, Freedmen’s descendants were turned back from the
polls.”).
90. Id.; see also Steve Russell, A Black and White Issue: The Invisibility of American
Indians in Racial Policy Discourse, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 129, 132 (1999); Evelyn
Nieves, Putting to a Vote the Question ‘Who Is Cherokee?,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/us/03cherokee.html.
91. Carla D. Pratt described the Dawes Rolls as follows:
The freedmen roll listed the names of the tribes’ freed slaves regardless
of whether they were of Indian ancestry. It also did not record which
freedmen had Native American blood. Rather, it merely listed their
names and the tribal affiliation of their former slavemaster. Thus, the
tribes and the federal government recognized people with Indian and
European ancestry as Indian and those of Indian and African ancestry
as Negro. Accordingly, the Dawes Commission was able to complete the
work of tribal antiblack miscegenation laws: by failing to document the
freedmen’s Indian ancestry on the rolls, the Dawes Commission created
the impression that all freedmen lacked Indian blood. Hence, the Dawes
Rolls create the legal fiction that Indian identity is Africanless. The
perception of the freedmen as non-Indian is still held today by some
members of the tribe who mistakenly think that all freedmen were “just
slaves.”
Carla D. Pratt, Loving Indian Style: Maintaining Racial Caste and Tribal Sovereignty
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effectively removed most Freedmen and their descendants from
tribal membership.92
In 1984, a group of Freedmen sued the Cherokee tribe, alleging
that the new membership criteria constituted unconstitutional race
discrimination.93 The district court dismissed the Freedmen’s claims,
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision.94 Specifically, the
appellate court based its decision on Santa Clara, stating, “A tribe’s
right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been
recognized as central to its existence as an independent political
community.”95 Thus, the court concluded that applying ICRA’s
equal protection provision to a tribe’s designation of its tribal
members would in effect eviscerate the tribe’s sovereign power to
define itself and would constitute an unacceptable interference
“with a tribe’s ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically
distinct entity.”96
The fight regarding the Freedmen continued for many years,
but in 2002, the Cherokee government sought to amend its
constitution to fully complete the disenfranchisement of the
Freedmen.97 This move was again challenged by a group of
Freedmen, and initially, they won.98 In March 2006, the Cherokee
Supreme Court held the amendment impermissible and declared
that the Freedmen were entitled to citizenship under the 1975

Through Sexual Assimilation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 409, 456–57 (2007) (citations
omitted).
92. Although the Dawes Rolls did not list blood quantum for the freedmen,
many actually had Indian ancestors. For various racial reasons, mixed-race
Cherokees were frequently placed on the freedmen rolls rather than the Indian
rolls. See Alex Kellogg, Cherokee Nation Faces Scrutiny for Expelling Blacks, NPR (Sept.
19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/19/140594124/u-s-government-opposes
-cherokee-nations-decision (noting that “blacks—even those who were part
Indian—were simply labeled as black on the Dawes Rolls”).
93. See Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1458–59 (10th Cir. 1989).
94. See id. at 1460–61 (confirming that Santa Clara provides the tribes with
immunity from suit for violations of ICRA).
95. Id. at 1463 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32
(1978)).
96. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 72.
97. Jon Velie, Should the United States Be Fighting for Jim Crow’s Survival by Its
Complicity in Denying Voting Rights to the Cherokee Freedmen?, 54 FED. LAW. 43, 44 (2007).
98. See Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, No. JAT-04-09, at 3 (Cherokee
Nation
Jud.
App.
Trib.
Mar.
7,
2006),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/allen-v-cherokee-nation.pdf.
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constitution.99 Many Cherokee members were unhappy with this
decision, and a constitutional referendum was called to address the
issue.100 An overwhelming majority of voters then voted to amend
the Cherokee constitution to limit tribal membership to persons
with documented Cherokee ancestry.101 In 2011, the Cherokee
Nation Supreme Court upheld the referendum results.102
Like Santa Clara, the Cherokee Freedmen cases were viewed as
a conflict between Indian and non-Indian values.103 The Cherokee
argued that, as a sovereign nation, it had the right to define its
membership and to do so in accordance with traditional Cherokee
values that emphasized the importance of ancestry and clan.104
However, critics of the Nation’s disenfranchisement decision saw it
as an atrocious civil rights violation that defied the core American
constitutional values of equality and fairness.105 Consequently,
although the courts in the Freedmen cases held that the principle of

99. Ray, supra note 85, at 388 (citing Allen, No. JAT-04-09, at 19).
100. Jessica Jones, Cherokee by Blood and the Freedmen Debate: The Conflict of Minority
Group Rights in a Liberal State, 22 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 19 (2009).
101. Id.
102. See Cherokee Nation Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, at 9 (Cherokee
Nation S. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/sc-11
-02-15-opinion-cn-registrar-v-nash.pdf; In re 2011 General Election, No. SC-2011-06,
at
1
(Cherokee
Nation
S.
Ct.
July
21,
2011),
http://www.cherokeecourts.org/Portals/73/Documents/Supreme_Court/SC-11
-06%2024-FINAL%20ORDER%207-21-11.pdf. Shortly before this article was
published, a federal district court held that the Cherokee Nation has the right to
determine its membership, subject to the 1866 Treaty between the federal
government and the Tribe, which stated that the Cherokee Freedmen are entitled
to membership in the Tribe. Cherokee Nation v. Nash, No. 13-01313, 2017 WL
3822870 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2017). The Tribe has decided not to appeal the decision.
Kat Chow, Judge Rules that Cherokee Freedmen Have Right to Tribal Citizenship, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 31, 2017, 7:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way
/2017/08/31/547705829/judge-rules-that-cherokee-freedmen-have-right-to-tribal
-citizenship.
103. Rebecca Tsosie, The Next Frontier in Federal Indian Law: Building on the
Foundational Work of Carole E. Goldberg, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1692, 1732 (2016).
104. Will Chavez, Cherokee Judge Rules for Freedmen in Citizenship Case, CHEROKEE
PHX. (Jan. 14, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20110118004854/http://
www.cherokeephoenix.org/25490/Article.aspx (quoting the Cherokee Nation
Attorney General as saying that “[w]e believe that the Cherokee people can change
our Constitution, and that the Cherokee citizenry clearly and lawfully enunciated
their intentions to do so in the 2007 amendment”).
105. See Tsosie, supra note 103, at 1731 (discussing how the Congressional Black
Caucus called for Congress to terminate the Cherokee Nation’s trust).
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tribal sovereignty prevented them from interfering with and
directing tribal membership decisions, others—most notably the
other branches federal government—were not nearly so sanguine
about the Tribe’s actions.106 In fact, in this case, the federal
government’s response demonstrated an outright refusal to respect
tribal sovereignty.107
After the Cherokee Supreme Court issued its decision
upholding the amendment expelling the Freedmen, Larry Echo
Hawk, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs for the U.S. Department
of the Interior, issued a menacing letter to the Cherokee
government.108 He wrote that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
“had never approved the constitutional amendment removing the
Freedmen and would consider the 2011 Cherokee election
unconstitutional if the Freedmen were prevented from voting.”109
He thus warned the Tribe to “consider carefully the Nation’s next
steps in proceeding with an election that does not comply with
federal law.”110
Echo Hawk’s letter was an unapologetic threat to Cherokee
tribal sovereignty and an announcement that the federal
government considered the Cherokee people unable to govern
themselves.111 It was also not the only government threat the Tribe
received.112 Ten days earlier, the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) froze thirty-three million dollars of
housing funds, which it stated would only be restored to the Tribe
once “the [Freedmen] issue is resolved.”113 In addition, the
106. See Echo Hawk, supra note 37.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Cody McBride, Placing a Limiting Principle on Federal Monetary Influences of
Tribes, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 387, 408–09 (2015).
110. Id. The Echo Hawk letter further stated that “[t]he Department will not
recognize any action taken by the Nation that is inconsistent with these principles
and does not accord its Freedmen members full rights of citizenship.” Echo Hawk,
supra note 37.
111. In 1997, federal intervention was needed to remove corrupt tribal leaders.
At the time, Chad Smith, incumbent chief, called the intervention by federal agents
“humiliating” and “embarrassing.” Sam Howe Verhovek, Cherokee Nation Facing a
Crisis Involving Its Tribal Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/06/us/cherokee-nation-facing-a-crisis
-involving-its-tribal-constitution.html?src=pm. It was a clear sign that the nation
appeared unable to govern itself. Id.
112. McBride, supra note 109, at 407–09.
113. Id. at 408.
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Cherokee Nation’s membership decision had so disgusted California
Congresswomen Diane Watson that even before the BIA or HUD got
involved, Watson introduced a bill to cut off all federal funding for
the tribe (estimated to be approximately 300 million dollars per
year) and suspend its ability to conduct gaming operations until full
citizenship was restored to the Freedmen.114
Cherokee leaders recognized that these threats posed a grave
risk to Cherokee sovereignty.115 After Watson introduced her bill,
incumbent Chief Chad Smith called it “a misguided attempt to
deliberately harm the Cherokee Nation in retaliation for this
fundamental principle that is shared by more than 500 other Indian
tribes.”116 The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) also
expressed its disapproval of the bill, describing it as akin to earlier
governmental policies designed to destroy Indian tribes.117 Similarly,
Echo Hawk’s letter led Acting Principle Chief Joe Crittenden to
114. Chris Casteel, Lawmaker Wants to Eliminate Funding for Cherokee Nations,
NEWSOK (June 22, 2007), http://newsok.com/article/3069097. On June 21, 2007,
U.S. Representative Diane Watson (D-California), one of the twenty-five
Congressional Black Caucus members who signed a letter asking the BIA to
investigate the Freedmen situation, introduced H.R. 2824. This bill sought to sever
the Cherokee Nation’s federal recognition, strip the Cherokee Nation of its federal
funding (estimated $300 million annually), and stop the Cherokee Nation’s gaming
operations if the Tribe did not honor the Treaty of 1866. H.R. 2824 was co-signed
by eleven Congress members and was referred to the Committee of Natural
Resources and the Committee of the Judiciary. H.R. 2824, 110th Cong. (2007),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/2824.
115. McBride, supra note 109, at 407 (“Facing mounting federal pressure,
including the loss of a substantial amount of federal funding, the Tribe caved to
federal demands and agreed to temporarily reinstate the Freedmen as citizens until
the federal court could reach a final decision.”).
116. Casteel, supra note 114.
117. President Joe Garcia described the bill with reference to the disastrous
Termination Era. He stated,
This is an uncalled for response to a question of treaty interpretation.
When Alabama or California takes an action inconsistent with
Congressional views, there is no discussion of revoking their statehood.
The attempt to revoke tribal nationhood is equally inappropriate. Not
since the Termination Era of the 1950s, when the official policy of the
federal government was complete destruction of indigenous peoples,
have we seen such a piece of legislation. NCAI was founded to oppose
termination of Indian tribes.
Jerry Reynolds, Freedmen Status at Issue in Washington, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA
NETWORK (June 29, 2007), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2007/06
/29/freedmen-status-issue-washington-91054.
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declare, “The Cherokee Nation will not be governed by the U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs.”118 These objections to the threatened
government interference were valid, but it was also clear that they
would be ineffective.119
The Cherokee government agreed to reinstate the Freedmen as
citizens120 once it became clear that its decision to justify racial
discrimination as a right of sovereignty wound up threatening that
very sovereignty.121 As both the Santa Clara and the Cherokee
Freedmen cases demonstrate, when tribes use sovereignty as the
justification for discriminatory actions, they jeopardize the future of
tribal sovereignty.
IV. TRIBAL TRADITIONS AND FAIRNESS
Tribes have the right to enact same-sex marriage bans, but after
Obergefell, it is extremely likely that such bans will negatively influence
non-Indian views of tribal sovereignty. The public response to both
the Santa Clara Pueblo and the Cherokee Nation’s controversial
decisions was extremely negative, and those cases only involved a
single tribe. In contrast, same-sex marriage bans involve many tribes
and hundreds of thousands of individuals. Unfair or not, non-Indian
perceptions of tribal justice are critically important for Indian
sovereignty, and thus, continuing tribal marriage bans has the
potential to significantly harm Indian tribes.

118. Acting Principle Chief Joe Crittenden further added, “We will hold our
election and continue our long legacy of responsible self-governance.” Jorge Rivas,
U.S. Government Pressures Cherokee Nation to Accept Descendants of Slaves, COLORLINES
(Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/us-government-pressures
-cherokee-nation-accept-descendants-slaves. Because the Cherokee Nation
Constitution does not allow elected officials to remain in office past Inauguration
Day, Smith was required to leave office on August 14, 2011. Crittenden was then
sworn in as deputy chief and elevated to acting principal chief in accordance with
the constitutional chain of succession.
119. McBride, supra note 109, at 409.
120. Id.
121. Compare id. (“Facing mounting federal pressure, including the loss of a
substantial amount of federal funding, the Tribe caved to federal demands and
agreed to temporarily reinstate the Freedmen as citizens until the federal court
could reach a final judicial decision.”), with Echo Hawk, supra note 37 (“The
Department will not recognize any action taken by the Nation that is inconsistent
with these principles and does not accord its Freedmen members full rights of
citizenship.”).
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Crow Dog and Tribal Justice

The United States has a long history of limiting Indian
sovereignty in response to perceived conflicts between Indian and
non-Indian customs and traditions.122 In fact, the entire body of
federal law pertaining to criminal jurisdiction over Indians was
created as a solution to the perceived problem of traditional tribal
justice.123 The case that spurred the call for federal assumption of
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country is Ex parte Crow Dog.124
However, the sad irony of the Crow Dog case is that many modern
Americans would now view the Indian justice meted out in Crow Dog
as fairer and more just than the punishment mandated by
nineteenth-century federal law.125
Ex parte Crow Dog involved the murder of one member of the
Brule Sioux band of the Sioux Nation by another member.126 The
question for the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the laws of the
United States governed this crime.127 The Court held they did not.128
According to the Crow Dog Court, it would be unfair to try an Indian
plaintiff according to U.S. law because such laws are “opposed to the
traditions of their history” and “the habits of their lives.”129

122. See, e.g., L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1996) (describing the history of the
American government in limiting Indian sovereignty).
123. E.g., Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority
over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 926 (2012) (“The
ethnocentric non-Indian view was that such tribal justice systems were inadequate
and western notions of criminal punishment should be imposed on tribes, and thus
the MCA became law.”).
124. Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
125. There are increasing arguments that the death penalty should be abolished
and that it violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. See generally JOHN BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH
PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT (2012); DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION (2010); JEFFREY
KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN DEATH
PENALTY (2015); ANDREW WELSH-HUGGINS, NO WINNERS HERE TONIGHT: RACE,
POLITICS, AND GEOGRAPHY IN ONE OF THE COUNTRY’S BUSIEST DEATH PENALTY STATES
(2009).
126. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 572.
129. Id. at 571.
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Therefore, the Court concluded that it would not “measure[] the
red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.”130
As the Court’s explanation suggests, when Crow Dog was decided
in 1883, there was a widespread perception that Indian and AngloAmerican forms of justice were vastly different.131 The Crow Dog
Court held that this difference justified exempting Indians from
federal criminal laws,132 but this was a minority view. By the time Crow
Dog was decided, most lawmakers believed that the difference
between Indian and non-Indian forms of justice required the
imposition of federal criminal law over Indian country.133
Consequently, shortly after Crow Dog was decided, the Secretary of
the Interior, Samuel Kirkwood, used the decision to demand
legislation permitting the federal courts to punish reservation
crimes.134 He stated,
If offenses of this character cannot be tried in the courts of
the United States, there is no tribunal in which the crime
of murder can be punished. . . . If the murder is left to be
punished according to the old Indian custom, it becomes
the duty of the next of kin to avenge the death of his
relative by either killing the murderer or some one of his
kinsman.135
Kirkwood’s statement accused tribal justice of demanding
indiscriminate revenge killings.136 This was incorrect.137 The
traditional form of justice the Sioux used to deal with murder was
restitution.138 Nevertheless, by portraying tribal justice as random,
130. Id.
131. See Raymond I. Orr, Liberal Defaults: The Pending Perception of “Special
Financial Rights” Among American Indian Nations, 47 TULSA L. REV. 515, 524 (2012)
(discussing how Congress passed the Major Crimes Act to apply uniformity in tribal
law after Ex parte Crow Dog).
132. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
133. See Orr, supra note 131, at 523 (discussing the strong public outcry after
Crow Dog).
134. 1884 COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR 9.
135. Id.
136. Id. (“If the murder is left to be punished according to the old Indian
custom, it becomes the duty of the next of kin to avenge the death of his relative by
either killing the murderer or some one of his kinsmen.”).
137. See Matthew Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against Tribal
Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 96 (2007) (“[Crow Dog] was punished
according to Lakota custom and tradition.”).
138. See, e.g., id. at 96 (discussing that after a tribal council meeting and
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bloodthirsty, barbaric, and unfair, the government was able to depict
it as inferior to the American criminal justice system.139 However, it
was actually federal law, not tribal law, that was premised on
revenge.140 Unlike tribal law, which required restitution to the
murder victim’s family, federal law demanded the perpetrator’s
death.141 Unfortunately, the veracity of the government’s revenge
claims did not matter. The fabricated difference between Indian and
non-Indian justice was accepted and then used to justify extending
federal criminal law over Indian country.142 Shortly after the Crow
Dog decision, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act and gave federal
courts the power to punish murder and other serious crimes that
occurred in Indian country.143
Although Crow Dog is an old case, the arguments it inspired,
namely that Indian justice is different and inferior to non-Indian
justice, have not disappeared.144 Every time a tribal government
enacts laws that conflict with fundamental American law principles,
there is the danger of reinforcing this perception.145 This does not
mean that tribal courts and legislatures should parrot federal law,
but it does mean that visible and controversial conflicts with federal
law cannot be considered purely tribal affairs. A tribe’s decision to
prefer male members, expel black members, or ban marriage
between LGBT members strongly influences how non-Indians view
mediation, Crow Dog was ordered to pay $600, eight horses, and one blanket to
Spotted Tail’s people).
139. See id. at 96–97 (“Non-Indians, fueled by local Indian agents, were enraged
by what they viewed as a lack of punishment.”).
140. Compare id. at 96 (the Tribal community punished Crow Dog by requiring
him to pay restitution to the victim’s family), with Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow
Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883) (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112
(Section 3 of that Act)) (“[E]very person who commits murder . . . within any fort,
arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall suffer death.”).
141. Id. at 96.
142. Id. at 97 (describing how Congress’s reaction to Crow Dog was to extend
federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. IV 1998).
144. E.g., infra Sections IV.B.1–2 (discussing the arguments put forth by
Petitioners in the Dollar General case that tribal courts are unsophisticated and
founded on traditions, custom, and bias).
145. Brief for Respondent, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians,
136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL 6083240, at *18 (“In the end,
petitioner’s argument is predicated on the baseless assertion that tribal courts are
unfit for nonmembers.”).
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tribal justice, and the recent Dollar General case demonstrates how
these views continue to threaten tribal sovereignty.146
B.

Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Dollar General Corp.

On June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its judgment in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Dollar General Corp.147 The Court
split 4-4, and the lower court’s decision was affirmed.148 This was the
narrowest of wins for the tribe, and, because there was no majority
decision, it does not eliminate the possibility of similar challenges in
the future.149 As the Dollar General case demonstrates, claims
regarding tribal injustice remain a powerful litigation strategy both
for organizations and individuals seeking to avoid tribal court
jurisdiction.150
Dollar General involved a sexual assault against a minor that was
allegedly perpetrated by a non-Indian employee of a Dollar General
store located in Indian country.151 This was a criminal assault, and it
should have led to criminal charges.152 Nevertheless, Dollar General
was filed as a civil suit and was only filed after it became clear there
would be no criminal prosecution of the non-Indian perpetrator.153

146. See generally infra Sections IV.B.1–2 (discussing the arguments put forth by
Petitioners in the Dollar General case).
147. 136 S. Ct. 2159.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See generally Aaron F. Arnold et al., State and Tribal Courts: Strategies for
Bridging the Divide, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 801, 816–18 (2012).
151. Dolgen Corp., Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 4:08-CV-22TSLJCS, 2008 WL 5381906, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2008), disapproved in later proceedings
sub nom. Dolgencorp Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 846 F. Supp. 2d 646
(S.D. Miss. 2011), aff’d, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Dollar Gen. Corp.
v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159.
152. But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding
that tribes do not have inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (reaching the
same conclusion as Oliphant). Thus, because the Tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction
over the alleged perpetrator—a non-Indian—it was the responsibility of the federal
government to prosecute, which it failed to do. See Ned Blackhawk, The Struggle for
Justice on Tribal Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www
.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/opinion/the-struggle-for-justice-on-tribal -lands.html.
153. Dolgen, 2008 WL 5381906, at *1.
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Sadly, this sequence of events is not unique.154 Most sexual assaults
in Indian country are never prosecuted.155
There are two reasons for the lack of criminal prosecution in
Indian country. The first stems from the 1978 case Oliphant v.
Squamish Indian Tribe,156 in which the Supreme Court held that tribes
have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.157 Pursuant to
Oliphant, only the federal government can prosecute non-Indians for
crimes committed in Indian country, and in Dollar General, as in the
majority of Indian sexual assault cases, the federal government
declined to prosecute.158
Once it appeared that the sexual assault would go unpunished,
the child and his family brought a civil suit against Dollar General in
tribal court.159 Dollar General objected.160 It argued that the Tribe
did not have jurisdiction over it, but the lower courts disagreed and
ruled for the Tribe.161 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari
to address the question of a tribe’s right to assert civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians.162
In its Supreme Court briefs, Dollar General had two primary
arguments for why tribal courts should not be able to assert

154. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS
WOMEN
FROM
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
63
(2006),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeofinjustice.pdf (“[F]indings indicate that
federal prosecutors frequently decline to pursue cases of sexual violence against
Native American women.”).
155. Id. at 62 (“The lack of comprehensive and centralized data collection by
tribal, state and federal agencies renders it impossible to obtain accurate
information about prosecution rates. However, survivors of sexual abuse, activists,
support workers and officials reported that prosecutions for crimes of sexual
violence against Indigenous women are rare in federal, state and tribal courts.”)
156. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
157. Id. at 210–12. This case was the culmination of efforts that began with Ex
parte Crow Dog to strip Indian tribes of criminal jurisdiction.
158. See Louise Erdrich, Rape on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013)
(noting that “[m]ore than 80 percent of sex crimes on reservations are committed
by non-Indian men, who are immune from prosecution by tribal courts,” and that
“federal prosecutors decline to prosecute 67 percent of sexual abuse cases”).
159. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th
Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S.
Ct. 2159 (2016).
160. Id.
161. Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (affirming lower courts’ judgments that the
tribal court has jurisdiction over Doe’s claims).
162. Id.
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jurisdiction over non-Indians.163 First, it argued that since tribal
courts lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, they are similarly
barred from exercising civil jurisdiction; and second, knowingly
consenting to tribal regulation is impossible because that would
require a jury to decide the Tribe’s unwritten tort law.164 Dollar
General attempted to support these positions by arguing that tribal
courts are unsophisticated compared to state and federal courts and
that they are inherently unjust.165 Paraphrasing Dollar General’s
argument, The Atlantic journalist Garrett Epps wrote that the
company argued that tribes “are poorly organized and badly run;
lack independence from tribal governments; don’t respect
constitutional rights; and enforce ‘tribal law, custom, and traditions’
rather than actual law. They aren’t really courts at all.”166 In the same
article, Epps also quoted Brendan Johnson, a former U.S. attorney
and experienced Indian-law litigator, who explained that “the
premise of Dollar General’s case is that tribal courts are inherently
incompetent and biased against non-members.”167
1.

Unsophisticated Tribal Courts

Dollar General’s argument regarding the unsophistication of
tribal courts was based on outdated and misleading information.
The company began this section of its brief by noting that “few
Indian tribes had operating judicial systems in place in the late
1970’s.”168 It then used this statement to imply that little had
changed.169 However, much has changed. The state of tribal justice
systems in the 1970s has little bearing on the sophistication of
modern tribal justice systems.170 In the 1990s, Congress approved
163. See Brief for Petitioners, Dollar Gen., 136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL
5169095, at *16–19.
164. Id.
165. See infra pages 44–52 and accompanying notes.
166. Garrett Epps, Who Can Tribal Courts Try?, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 7 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/who-can-tribal-courts-try
/419037/.
167. Id.
168. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 163, at *2 (citing Court of Indian Offenses,
U.S.
DEP’T
INTERIOR,
INDIAN
AFF.,
https://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre
/RegionalOffices/SouthernPlains/WeAre/ciospr/index.htm).
169. Id. at *2–3.
170. The Petitioners’ brief cites also a 2002 statistic showing that only
approximately 60% of tribes had such court systems. Id. However, this argument is
a red herring and an attempt to distract from the actual issue in the case—the
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billions of dollars in funding to improve and enhance tribal law
enforcement and court systems.171 Consequently, over the past thirty
years, there has been a rapid increase in the construction of new
tribal courthouses and jails, as well as significant investments in
technology, communications, and public safety programs.172 In
addition, hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funding was
approved to train tribal court judges, lawyers, paralegals, and other
courthouse personnel.173
The implication of Dollar General’s general attack on tribal
justice systems is that tribes should be treated as monolithic and that
the weakness of one tribal court should be considered a failing of
them all. This argument is wrong. Regardless of the state of tribal
justice systems in general, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians’
justice system is one of the most sophisticated and successful tribal

jurisdiction of the Choctaw Tribal Court, which is a well-established and highly
respected tribal court. Whether other tribes have less sophisticated courts is
irrelevant and was mentioned by Dollar General solely to cast doubt on the fairness
of tribal justice in general. As the brief of amici Cherokee Nation et al. noted,
Much of the States’ argument against tribal jurisdiction here rests on a
sweeping indictment of all tribal judicial systems. With strikingly few
citations, the States broadly condemn tribal courts as biased and lacking
independence, and tribal law as mysterious, in- accessible, and indeed
all but incoherent. Based on this far-reaching attack, the States—despite
asserting that “tribal court systems vary wildly,” and contrary to their
argument that “[t]his Court should not impose a one-size-fits-all rule”—
urge the Court to deprive every tribal court in the country of jurisdiction
over civil tort claims like the one asserted here.
Brief for the Cherokee Nation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 131496), 2015 WL 6445772, at *16.
171. Indian Self Determination and Educational Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975). This program was highly successful. See Brief for the
Cherokee Nation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 170,
at *26 (explaining that many tribal courts are sophisticated and “closely resemble
federal and state courts,” as “[t]hey are established by (publicly available)
constitutions and laws; their structure, personnel, and procedures are set by
(publicly available) tribal laws; they apply published tribal statutes and the common
law to decide disputes; and their decisions are publicly available, including on the
Internet”).
172. Suzette Brewer, Tribal Justice on Trial: Dollar General Part II, INDIAN COUNTRY
MEDIA NETWORK (Nov. 24, 2015), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com
/news/politics/tribal-justice-on-trial-dollar-general-part-ii/.
173. Id.
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justice systems in the country.174 In 2012, the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court judges recognized the Mississippi Band of
Choctaw court as a model court.175 Similarly, John Echohawk, cofounder of the Native American Rights Funds, singled out the
Mississippi Choctaw court for special recognition, noting “Many
tribal courts across the country, including the Mississippi Choctaw,
have some of the best, most experienced litigators and legal
practitioners in the country.”176 Dollar General’s arguments about
the unsophistication of tribal courts were therefore particularly
inapplicable to the Mississippi Choctaw.
The company’s attack on tribal courts ignored the decades of
improvements that many tribes have undergone and the fact that
many tribes now have courts that are notably more sophisticated
than their surrounding state and county courts.177 It is extremely
telling that the same report Dollar General cited to demonstrate the
unsophistication of tribal courts also described the weaknesses of
many state courts.178 In fact, this study included the astounding
statistic that “more than 40% of the magistrates in Alaska’s state
courts ‘are not law trained.’”179 This statistic is shocking, yet Dollar

174. Another is the Navajo justice system, which adjudicates nearly 75,000 cases
a year in its tribal court system. Id.
175. According to Indian Country Media Network, the organization praised the
Tribe for its “brand new, state-of-the-art justice complex” and its ability to handle
“all manner of criminal, civil, youth, and peacemaking courts.” Id. In addition, the
Tribe’s three-member Supreme Court includes Edwin R. Smith, “a battle hardened
Mississippi lawyer who is no stranger to the U.S. Supreme Court.” Id. Smith
represented the Tribe in two pivotal Indian law cases, United States v. Smith John and
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. Id.; see also, Lee Romnet, Tribal Judge
Works for Yurok-Style Justice, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.latimes.com
/local/la-me-yurok-tribal-judge-20140305-dto-htmlstory.html
(profiling
Abby
Abinanti, Chief Judge of the Yurok Tribe and San Francisco Superior Court
Commissioner).
176. Brewer, supra note 172 (describing how “tribal tribunals are as
sophisticated as any municipal court in Arizona in terms of how they operate.”).
177. E.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 32 n.13, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159
(2016) (No. 13-1496).
178. NEIL NESHEIM, INST FOR COURT MGMT., EVALUATING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN
ALASKA:
THE
KAKE
CIRCLE
7
(2010),
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/famct/id/293
(arguing that the “North American criminal justice system is broken”).
179. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 177, at 32 n.13.
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General suggests that even these courts are preferable to a tribal
court.
Dollar General attempted to support its position by arguing that
“the lack of judicial training and independence, the risk of local bias
and the limited protections against it, etc.” are “the features of tribal
courts that risk unfair treatment of outsiders.”180 However, simply
declaring tribes to be biased does not make it true. In fact, studies
on the subject of tribal bias have demonstrated tribal court
impartiality. For example, in her 2005 article, Tribal Justice and the
Outsider, Professor Bethany Berger examined Navajo appellate
decisions involving disputes between Navajos and non-Navajos and
found that they were closely balanced. According to Berger, nonNavajos won 47.4% and lost 52.6% of the cases in which they
appeared before the tribal court from 1969 to 2004.181 As Berger’s
study indicates, Indians and non-Indians have a nearly equal chance
of winning in tribal court.182
Unfortunately, the perception of unfairness raised in the Dollar
General’s briefs was not simply an accusation of bias against nonIndians; it was also the claim that simply subjecting non-Indians to
Indian customs and traditions is itself unfair.183 This was Dollar
General’s second argument, and the one that, because it is based
more on perception than facts, is much more difficult to refute.
2.

Traditions, Customs, and Bias

Dollar General’s second criticism of tribal courts was that they
are unfair to non-Indian defendants.184 The company argued that
non-Indian defendants are not likely to be familiar with tribal
customs.185 Additionally, it argued that even if non-Indians were
180. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 163, at *54.
181. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1047, 1075–76 (2005) (noting that this rate was
“consistent across . . . various kinds of disputes,” “[w]hether the issue is child
custody, torts, contracts, or employment”).
182. Id. at 1075.
183. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 163, at *38 (“Subjecting nonmembers
to civil claims for punitive and other damages by a sovereign operating within the
boundaries of the United States but existing outside of the constitutional structure
is . . . inconsistent with the constitutional plan.”).
184. Id. at *8 (“Nonmembers’ status as outsiders thus can give rise to a
substantial risk of unfair treatment.”).
185. See id. at *6–7 (explaining that “the content of tribal law is often knowable
only to a few tribe members”); see also id. at *39 (highlighting that because tribal
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familiar with such customs, they should still not apply because Indian
customs and traditions are manifestly unfair when applied to nonmembers.186 It is this belief that formed the crux of the company’s
criticism of tribal justice.187
In the section of its brief titled “Background on Tribal Courts,”
Dollar General argued that the primary danger of tribal court
jurisdiction was the use of custom and tradition.188 The company
noted that traditional tribal methods of dispute resolution “differed
substantially from state and federal legal systems.”189 It then added
that many modern tribes continued to “require their courts to apply
tribal law, custom, and traditions.”190 Later in the brief, the company
further emphasized the role of tradition when it stated that “forty
percent [of tribes] had some unpublished tribal laws or customs
applying to non-Indians.”191
Tribal custom and tradition were repeatedly invoked
throughout Dollar General’s brief as a kind of boogeyman to be
feared.192 In fact, the words “tradition” and “custom”—or their
derivatives—are mentioned eighteen times in the brief.193 For
example, Dollar General stated, “In both civil and criminal cases,
tribal courts ‘are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and
usages of the tribes they serve.’”194 It then cited an earlier Supreme
Court case, Plains Commerce, and the “‘novel’ legal rule applied by
[the] tribal court based on ‘Lakota tradition . . . and custom.’”195
Later, Dollar General noted that “these differences can be a point of
pride among . . . tribes, reflecting each tribe’s ‘unique customs,
languages, and usages,’” but emphasized that the differences create
courts “are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes
they serve,” authority should not extend over those who have not given consent).
186. See id. at *36–40.
187. See id. (noting that in the past the Supreme Court has held “that tribal
courts . . . [that] have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers would raise serious
constitutional questions”).
188. See id. at *6–9.
189. Id. at *3.
190. Id. at *6.
191. Id. at *7.
192. See, e.g., id. at *6 (“Numerous tribes, including the Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians, require their courts to apply tribal law, custom, and traditions,
looking to state law only to fill in gaps in tribal law.”).
193. Id. passim.
194. Id. at *39 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990)).
195. Id. at *53 (quoting Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 338 (2008)).
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unfairness for non-Indians because “it is often impossible for a
business to discern the content of all the . . . tribal traditions
potentially applicable to its relationship with tribal employees and
customers.”196 Then, to emphasize this point even further, Dollar
General wrote,
Like other tribes, the Choctaw contemplate that even tribal
judges may be ignorant of the law they must apply in all its
relevant details, providing that, when “doubt arises as to the
customs and usages of the Tribe, the court may request the
advice of persons generally recognized in the community
as being familiar with such customs and usages.”197
Dollar General’s reference to strange and unfair tribal customs
is a red herring. As the federal government noted in its amicus brief
in support of the Tribe, “Here, in particular, there is no suggestion
that proving a breach of duty to refrain from sexual molestation
would require resort to ‘unique customs, languages, and usages’ of
the Tribe.”198 Prohibiting child molestation is not some “strange”
Indian custom.199 It is a core tenet of American criminal law, and
consequently, Dollar General’s arguments regarding the dangers of
tribal traditions and customs in this context should have appeared
absurd. The fact that they did not is both illuminating and
disheartening. Concern regarding tribal customs and traditions
remained so great that Dollar General believed these fears could
even outweigh the strong desire to protect children from sexual
predators.

196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Choctaw Tribal Code § 1-1-4). The amici brief of the states of
Oklahoma, Wyoming, and South Dakota raised similar concerns, stating that
“[w]here important rules of decision reside in tribal customs as communicated by
tribal elders, even if judges are independent, the really important decisions on tribal
law may be made by tribal elders with no obligations of independence.” Brief
Amicus Curiae of the States of Oklahoma, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 10–11,
Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of the Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No.
13-1496).
198. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 177, at 22.
199. See generally PAT SEKAQUAPTEWA ET AL., A VICTIM-CENTERED APPROACH TO
CRIMES AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN (2008) (providing
an overview of tribal laws and underlying policies impacting the well-being of
children, including the prohibition of child molestation).
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The Indian Child Welfare Act

Dollar General’s arguments focused on the potential danger of
imposing Indian traditions on non-Indians. However, it has typically
been the converse—the imposition of non-Indian customs and
values on tribal members—that has caused the most significant
harm.200 For decades, Indian children were removed from their
families and placed in Indian boarding schools and adoptive homes
because Anglo-American society deemed Indian culture and
customs backwards and harmful.201 In 1978, Congress enacted the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)202 in an attempt to finally protect
Indian families from courts and state agencies seeking to impose
western values and traditions on Indian families.203
ICWA has often been called the most important piece of Indian
law ever passed;204 yet its ability to overcome non-Indian biases
against Indian culture and customs has been minimal. Thirty-seven
200. Id. at 10 (explaining that forced boarding school policies separating native
children from their tribal customs left many children “victims of child physical,
sexual, torture and/or emotional abuse” and those “victims . . . were largely left
untreated and many were at risk for poor parenting, drug and alcohol abuse, mental
health issues, relationship and health challenges”).
201. See Ann Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and Its Continuing
Impact on Tribal Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L. REV. 149,
149 (2007) (explaining that boarding school policies were an “attempt [by] the
federal government to eradicate the language and culture of American Indians in
an attempt to turn them into a white man with different colored skin”); see also
SEKAQUAPTEWA, supra note 199, at 10 (“Forced boarding school policies in the late
1880’s separated Native children from their families and communities and placed
them at great risk in unfamiliar institutional settings.”).
202. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (1978).
203. See id. In addition, Dollar General is not the only recent case to make this
argument. In FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-bannock Tribes, No. 4:14-CV-489-BLW, 2015 WL
6958066, at *2 (D. Idaho Nov. 9, 2015), FMC argued that the tribal court process
was biased and that the two judges hearing its case were also biased.
204. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Fort & Peter S. Vicaire, The Invisible Families: Child Welfare
and American Indian Active Duty Servicemembers and Veterans, FED. LAW., at 1 (Apr. 15,
2015) (describing ICWA as “one of the most important pieces of federal legislation
for American Indian families”); Sheri L. Hazeltine, Speedy Termination of Alaska
Native Parental Rights: The 1998 Changes to Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid Statutes and
Their Inherent Conflict with the Mandates of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 19 ALASKA
L. REV. 57, 59 (2002) (calling ICWA “one of the most important and far-reaching
pieces of legislation protecting Indian tribes”); Alex T. Skibine, Indian Gaming and
Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 284–85 (2010) (referring to ICWA as
“perhaps the most important legislation enacted during this [self-determination]
era”).
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years after ICWA, Indian children are still routinely removed from
their Indian families.205 As recently as 2015, South Dakota was held
to have violated ICWA by disproportionately removing Indian
children from their families and placing them in white homes.206 In
one particularly telling example, South Dakota Judge Jeff Davis was
found to have removed Indian children from their families one
hundred percent of the time.207 Matthew Newman, an attorney at the
Native American Rights Fund, stated, “We’re often finding states
inventing any reason under the sun . . . not to place [the] child with
[his or her] family.”208
In response to these high rates of non-compliance, the BIA
recently passed new regulations to guide state courts and private and
public agencies on the implementation of ICWA.209 One of the most
important goals of these new regulations is to limit what can be
considered “good cause” for placing Indian children in non-Indian
homes.210 Indian advocates hope these new regulations will help
keep Indian children with their families and tribes and counteract
the extreme biases against Indian customs and traditions that made
ICWA necessary in the first place.211

205. Stephen Pevar, Why Are These Indian Children Being Torn Away from Their
Homes?, ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (July 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/why-are
-these-indian-children-being-torn-away-their-homes (“Congress passed the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978 in an effort to stop American Indian families
from having their children removed by state and local officials for invalid and
sometimes even racist reasons. Yet 36 years later, Indian children in South Dakota
are 11 times more likely to be removed from their families and placed in foster care
than non-Indian children.”).
206. Laura Sullivan, Native American Tribes Win Child Welfare Case in South Dakota,
NPR (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/31/396636927/native
-american-tribes-win-child-welfare-case-in-south-dakota (noting that in South
Dakota, “[m]ore than 80 percent of native children are placed in white foster
homes” and that “[o]ne of the biggest complaints of native families who lost
children is that they were never allowed to present their side”).
207. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (D.S.D. 2015).
208. Casey Tolan, A Series of New Lawsuits Is Challenging How Native American Kids
Are Adopted, FUSION (July 17, 2015), http://fusion.net/story/168764/a-series-of-new
-lawsuits-is-challenging-how-native-american-kids-are-adopted.
209. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody
Proceedings, 80 Fed. Reg. 10146, 10149 (Feb. 25, 2015).
210. Tolan, supra note 208.
211. See id.
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The original goal of ICWA was to combat the widespread
prejudice against Indian customs.212 Through the Act, Congress
sought to demonstrate that Native and non-Native child rearing
practices were not in conflict; though traditional Native customs
might differ from Anglo-American child rearing norms, these
practices could, and in fact were likely to, protect a child’s best
interest.213 As stated in the preamble, the goal of ICWA is “to protect
the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families.”214 Unfortunately, as both
Dollar General and recent ICWA cases demonstrate, the distrust of
tribal traditions is well entrenched in American society, and it may
take more than new regulations to change how non-Indians view
Indian families and Indian practices in general.
V. THE FUTURE
Some of the distrust of tribal customs is simple prejudice.
Nevertheless, cases like Santa Clara and the Cherokee Freedmen
cases make it harder to dismiss non-Indian concerns regarding tribal
justice.215 As Dollar General demonstrated, legitimate concerns
regarding tribal traditions and justice paved the way for broader
arguments in favor of limiting tribal civil jurisdiction over nonIndians.216 A decision favoring Dollar General would have been a
212. Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the
“Existing Indian Family” Exception (Re)imposes Anglo American Legal Values on American
Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329, 358
(2009) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978)) (“ICWA was to establish standards for the
removal of Indian children that would ‘reflect the unique values of Indian culture’
and provide ‘assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs.’”).
213. See id. at 365 (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 34–35 (1989)) (“One of the most serious failings of the present system is that
Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by non-tribal
government authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural
and social premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the
individuals who decide the fate of our children are at best ignorant of our cultural
values, and at worst contemptful of the Indian way and convinced that removal,
usually to a non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian child.”).
214. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
215. Zug, supra note 23 (“Historically, when tribal and Anglo-American values
were in conflict, non-Indians tended to disparage tribal values as backwards,
inferior, and unjust. These instances put tribal sovereignty at risk, as evidenced by
[Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez].”).
216. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 163, at *16.
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devastating blow to tribal sovereignty. The narrow victory in that case
should serve as a warning: Using tribal sovereignty to protect
discriminatory traditions can wind up harming tribal sovereignty in
the long run. This is particularly true right now when tribes are just
beginning to regain an important measure of criminal jurisdiction
over both Indian and non-Indian defendants.217
The first major change to tribal court criminal jurisdiction
occurred in 2010, when President Obama signed the Tribal Law and
Order Act (TLOA),218 which allowed tribes to impose stronger
penalties on Indian defendants charged with serious crimes.219 A few
years later, tribal court criminal jurisdiction was expanded further;
in 2013, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was amended to
permit tribal governments to assert criminal jurisdiction over nonIndian defendants and impose harsher sentences on them.220
Although both of these changes were implemented in order to help
tribes address the domestic violence crisis plaguing Indian country,
they were still highly contentious.221 The VAWA amendments only
passed after numerous “safeguards” were put in place to ensure the
defendants would be treated fairly, meaning would be treated fairly
as if they were being tried in a non-Indian court.222 One author
217. See infra note 218–20 and accompanying text.
218. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat.
2261 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
219. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012) (defining crimes to which enhanced sentences
may be applied).
220. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 1134, § 4, 127 Stat. 54, 120–21.
221. The Court’s recent unanimous decision in U.S. v Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954,
1966 (2016), may indicate that, at least with Indian defendants, increased tribal
court jurisdiction is becoming less controversial. In that case, the Court held there
was no Sixth Amendment violation when the federal court used Bryant’s previous
tribal court convictions for domestic violence to charge him as a “habitual offender”
and subject him to an increased sentence. However, even if Bryant does portend
such a change with regard to Indian defendants, it may have little implication for
acceptance of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. There is a long history of greater
acceptance of tribal court jurisdiction over Indians, including non-member Indians.
See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
222. Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Violence Against Woman Act Special Domestic Violence
ACCESS
TO
JUST.
INNOVATION,
Criminal
Jurisdiction,
TRIBAL
http://www.tribaljustice.org/program-profiles/violence-against-women-act-special
-domestic-violence-criminal-jurisdiction (last visited Jan. 6, 2017) (“The Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 contains a series of legal requirements
that must be satisfied in order for a tribe to exercise Special Domestic Violence
Criminal Jurisdiction. These requirements act as procedural safeguards to ensure
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reviewing the legislation noted that “[s]ome members of Congress
had fought hard to derail the legislation, arguing that non-Indian
men would be unfairly convicted without due process by sovereign
nations whose unsophisticated tribal courts were not equal to the
American criminal justice system.”223 Due to these objections, the
Obama administration was only able to push through the narrowest
version of the law—the law does not cover child abuse or sexual
assaults committed by non-Indians who are not in a relationship with
their victims.224 Still, it was an important first step.225
In the spring of 2015, three “pilot” tribes began hearing
domestic violence cases involving non-Indian defendants.226 Indian
advocates hope that these pioneering tribes will allay fears about the
sophistication and fairness of tribal courts.227 Tribes hamper such
efforts, however, when they use their sovereignty and customs to
defend otherwise unconstitutional laws. As Dollar General
demonstrated, the widespread perception that tribal customs are
foreign and unjust poses a real threat to tribal sovereignty.228
Consequently, tribes should think long and hard before using their
sovereignty to insist on preserving laws that the majority of
Americans consider unjust.229 Accordingly, tribes affirming the right
that non-Indian defendants are provided the due process protections that they
would receive in federal or state court.”).
223. SARI HOROWITZ, JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 31 (2015) (ebook).
224. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, § 4. VAWA of 2013
requires the tribe to prove that the victim and defendant were in an “intimate” or
“dating” relationship before moving forward with prosecution.
225. See HOROWITZ, supra note 223, at 31.
226. Justice Department Announces Three Tribes to Implement Special Domestic Violence
Criminal Jurisdiction Under VAWA 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 6, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-three-tribes
-implement-special-domestic-violence-criminal (selecting Pascua Yaqui, Umatilla,
and Tulalip as the three tribes for the pilot project).
227. See id. (“[B]y certifying certain tribes to exercise jurisdiction over these
crimes, we will help decrease domestic and dating violence in Indian Country,
strengthen tribal capacity to administer justice and control crime, and ensure that
perpetrators of sexual violence are held accountable for their criminal behavior.”).
228. See, e.g., Max Minzner, Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and
Outside Indian Country, 6 NEV. L.J. 89, 104 (2005) (“In traditional courts, custom
often trumps other sources of decisional law, including statutes and federal law, in
a way that is very dissimilar to the use of common law in state courts. In these types
of courts, there is some reason to believe that non-members will be subjected to a
system that is foreign and unfamiliar and thus lacks a level playing field.”).
229. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 69 n.28 (1978) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 90-841, at 6 (1967)) (“The purpose of [ICRA] is to protect individual
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to ban same-sex-marriages should consider that such an assertion of
sovereignty may ultimately prove threatening to tribal autonomy at
large.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tribal customs and traditions have often been used to unfairly
deprive Indian tribes of their jurisdiction, their land, and even their
children. At the same time, tribes have also relied on their customs
and traditions to justify practices that many believe unfairly deprive
tribal members of their rights. In this, tribes are not unique. The
United States has a long history of refusing to recognize the rights of
women, racial minorities, and other disfavored groups. In many
cases, it has taken decades or even centuries to correct these
injustices. Unfortunately, Indian tribes do not have the luxury of
time. When tribes insist on continuing practices that American law
has rejected as discriminatory and unjust, they risk proliferating the
perception that tribal justice is generally unfair. Certain tribal
customs and traditions may justify running such a risk, but it is
doubtful that same-sex marriage bans fall into this category.
For the first time in decades, tribes are beginning to exercise
their sovereign power to protect their communities, particularly
their women and children, from horrific violence. The importance
of this change cannot be overstated. It would be a tragedy if banning
same-sex marriage derailed this achievement.

Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions by tribal governments.”).
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